Including air navigation to the airport company

Books- Ibrahim Adlan .. Including air navigation to the airport company .. more than one angle

Brother Abu Al -Awal, a diligent man, the contemporary of the chapter from its beginnings, but he is under the influence of the idea that the separation is considered incomplete if the air navigation does not join the Sudanese Airports Company and this is Mind set, entered by Muhammad Abdulaziz in the heads of the company’s employees when he told them that (air navigation will join the company within two years) as a verbal drug for them in the hope that it will work to include it later.

The separation experience needs to be evaluated and evaluated by answering a question. Do we apply the chapter as it should? Without looking at the Sudanese privacy and at once without a natural gradient? It ensures that there is no confusion and the deterioration that affected the state airports, then the air navigation: a sovereign facility is not operating.

In the midst of the debate on the restructuring of the civil aviation sector in Sudan, the issue of the air navigation facility is highlighted as one of the most important facilities that require an accurate institutional position that is consistent with the nature of its work, and they maintain its vital role in protecting the state’s sovereignty and ensuring its national security. Perhaps it is a grave error to classify air navigation within the operational body just because it provides “services”, such as air control services and air traffic management, without regard to the nature of these services and its strategic importance that goes beyond the traditional concept of operation.

The nature of air navigation: services of a sovereign nature

The Air traffic administration is not just a commercial or service activity that can be included in the tasks of operating companies, but rather a daily exercise of the state’s sovereignty over its atmosphere, and an extension of its legal and actual authority on its air borders. Every plane crosses the airspace of Sudan passes with the permission of the air navigation facility, and is subject to its directives and instructions, which makes this facility the first line of defense for the Sudanese airspace.

The Chicago International Civil Aviation Agreement (1944) stipulated in its first article that “every country has a full and absolute sovereignty over the air space that rises to its territory,” which is a sovereignty that is achieved only through a sovereign technical apparatus that organizes and monitors this space, and ensures that it is not penetrated or threatened.

The ICAO Document No. 9859 – the global guide for safety manual management systems also indicates the necessity of the clear separation between the ANSPS and regulatory bodies, in a manner that ensures that interests are not conflicting and protects the integrity of the atmosphere.

Institutional confusion: its risks to safety and sovereignty

The insistence on including the air navigation facility to the operational objects – such as airports or aviation companies – is a dangerous contempt for the necessity of the job separation between sovereign authorities and profit or service agencies. This integration is not only violated with the principles of good governance and weather safety, but also submits the Sudanese airspace of politicization, and perhaps for penetration, if it is not managed by an independent and neutral sovereign party, subject to state control, not to control companies.

The calls to include the air navigation facility to the Sudanese Airports Company – under the pretext of integrating services or achieving operational integration – are calls that ignore the depth of the sovereign role of this facility, and contradict the most basic international standards in organizing the airspace. The conversion of this facility into an administration subject to operation and economic return considerations is a direct threat to the country’s security, and a deformation of an institution that must remain in the heart of the state’s sovereign apparatus.

We call on everyone who adopts this proposal to review international experiences and reference texts, and realize that countries do not overlook their sovereign facilities and do not involve them in commercial bodies – especially in countries with security fragility and political transition such as Sudan.

International models and experiences

1. Canada (NAV Canada): A pioneering model in the privatization of the air navigation facility within a non -profit institution independent of the government and airlines, but it is subject to state control and coordinated directly with the Canadian Air Force.
2. UK (NATS): A mixed company providing air navigation services, the British government has a strategic share, and is managed independently of airport operators and airlines, with a strict regulatory system from the British Civil Aviation Authority.
3. United States (FAA): Air navigation services directly follow the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a federal government agency that is not intended for profit, and is managed as part of state security and under the supervision of Congress.
4. South Africa (ATNS): A public institution that manages air navigation services independently of airport operators, with a close connection with the Ministry of Transport and Defense, and is part of the strategic structure of national security.
5. Kenya: It separated the air navigation services from the Civil Aviation Authority, and an independent body was established in the name of Kenya Air Navigation Services (Kans), subject to government control, and provides services as an independent entity to ensure neutrality and professionalism.

Recommendation: Installing the sovereign character of air navigation

What we need in Sudan is the explicit recognition that the air navigation facility should be managed within an independent sovereign entity – whether as a public institution or a state affiliated with the state – and it has clear organizational and technical powers, away from operational objects, while ensuring full coordination with the security and defense authorities.

conclusion

Air navigation is not just a service; It is a sovereign tool, one of the pillars of protecting the state from external threats, and an essential element in imposing Sudan’s sovereignty over its atmosphere. Therefore, any attempt to integrate it into operational bodies is a strategic error that must be remedied in the institutional reconstruction phase of the civil aviation sector after the war and that before those who want to benefit from air navigation income is to return to the job separation of the civil aviation sector as it was called by ICAO documents instead of the organic separation through one body inclusive of the sector