New variables in the scene in “Sudan” .. Egypt is an influential player

By: Amani Al-Tawil- The events of the Al-Owainat region as an Egyptian border region with Sudan and Libya are a turning point in my belief in the Egyptian interaction with the Sudanese and Libyan crises together, as a direct result of the recent developments, as the Egyptian border was hacked by the Rapid Support Forces.

Perhaps without realization that they are Egyptian lands, then withdrawn from them with rapid support in Sudanese territory after military battles and threw flying against rapid support, under the umbrella of allegations of protection from illegal immigration.

Perhaps the statements of Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (Hamidati) in which Egypt flirted with, linked to this development in an attempt to surround its negative impact on the rapid support forces, and also targeting an attempt to neutralize Egypt in the Sudanese conflict.

Cairo, as usual, has cautious and complex accounts towards their direct regional neighborhood countries, especially Sudan, and therefore it often moves away from the quick reactions, and its performance is often linked to its national security data at the strategic level.

From this angle, we can see the Egyptian estimates and motives in receiving Major General Khalifa Haftar and his sons, arms leaders in the Libyan army, in conjunction with the reception of General Abdel Fattah Al -Burhan, the Sudanese Minister of Defense in the Egyptian City of El Alamein, in individual and dual meetings, according to the announced media, and perhaps the three leaders gathered, a meeting that has not been announced; Due to the fact that developments in the border triangle have become extremely sensitive to Cairo.

In my opinion, the Egyptian appreciation has first gone that there is a need to encircle the military interactions on the Egyptian border from the Sudanese sides, whatever its limbs, and the Libyan from the point of view of its interactions with the rapid support forces against the backdrop of previous support in the furnace of the military conflict over the Libyan soil, and perhaps also with direct push from the UAE, under the umbrella of military challenges currently faced by the rapid support forces, after the Sudanese army regained its offensive capabilities in terms of the area In the north of the Darfur region on the other hand.

On the Libyan level, Cairo’s efforts seek to neutralize Haftar’s forces in the Sudanese conflict, as this is threatened by Egyptian national security on the one hand, and also threatening the Egyptian support for Haftar in Libyan equations.

As for the Sudanese level, the Egyptian appreciation is currently going to the current time that is appropriate for the involvement in ending the Sudanese military conflict, in light of the escalation of its threats to Egyptian national security on the one hand, and the temporary calm of the Israel Front/ Iran on the other hand, and also the trend to stop the fire in Gaza, which are the two files that broke out Egyptian effort and interest during the last period.

In this context, it is necessary to pay attention to two things, the first is that the international environment has become favorable to start coordinated efforts regarding the endeavor to stop the Sudanese war.

As for the regional environment, it is occupied by the Israeli -Iranian war and its results, under the umbrella of the results of this war, which did not resolve a victory for one of the two parties, which means that we are facing an open military conflict, with serious repercussions on the Gulf region, without exception, especially after the bombing of the American base on Qatari lands, which means that Washington was unable to protect the Gulf from Iran, and the American military bases have become, perhaps without use.

In the same context, the Gulf Home Front has become threatened by Asian workers who constitute a million, after we witnessed an Israeli intelligence breach of Iran affecting the course of the war, through foreign workers.

These conditions and developments will have repercussions on the Gulf performance in Sudan during the next stage, as it is more likely that the Gulf effort is on the threats, and even gradually return to the traditional historical conditions, in that Cairo is considered a fundamental actor in Sudan that can be relied upon.

The Egyptian determinants at this stage, according to what we see from the visuals are the support of the Sudanese armed forces, as an institution represented by the Sudanese state, regardless of the nature of the army’s alliances currently with some Sudanese political forces that Cairo views as a temporary stage.

In this context, the efforts to stop the Sudanese war will require interaction with all parties involved in it, including an attempt to reduce the pressure of both Islamic allies and armed factions on the army, and of course deal with the rapid support forces on the army’s legitimacy as a national institution, as well as the Sudanese National Dirt Unit.

According to this, despite the flirtation of Hamidati to Egypt, the Egyptian interaction with him will not exceed these determinants, and perhaps this prompted the announcement of the leadership council for “establishment”, given that his flirting with Cairo did not achieve the desired results from it.

On a parallel level, Cairo’s attention to the necessities of the internal Sudanese consensus, as one of the levers to stop the war, will make the issue of holding the second conference of the Sudanese political forces in the Egyptian capital, a duty during this summer, a conference in which the Sudanese political forces may be on the issue of holding the elections after a short transitional period, according to curricula and systems that seek a realistic representation of the Sudanese demographic component, in a way that absorbs ethnic diversity And the tribal, as well as the representation of the Sudanese civil forces, prevents the army from being overwhelmed by power, as this is one of the conditions for political stability in Sudan, which is dominated by the power of society and the weak national integration.

According to the final statement issued by the meeting of President Sisi and the team of proof, the Egyptian relief support for the necessary reconstruction requirements in Sudan, especially the health and medical ones agreed upon, as well as the revival of what was called in the statement by the old agreements between Egypt and Sudan, which will most likely the four freedom agreements, is a positive development.

In total, it seems that we are facing variables in the Sudanese military and political scene, in which Cairo will be an influential player from this angle. I call to be added to the traditional Egyptian tools in interacting with the Sudanese scene new mechanisms, in which the solid mechanisms of the Egyptian state are supported in tasks that are complicated by their nature. From this, the expansion of consultation with the Sudanese civil component, and the provision of opportunities for Egyptian civil interaction with the Sudanese complainant from the angles of thinking about developing new approaches and policies, which are proposed on the Sudanese internal challenges.

Source: Egyptian 360