Between land and wave .. Eritrean site and the marine strategies of Ethiopia in the geopolitical extensions of the Red Sea

Between land and wave .. Eritrean site and the marine strategies of Ethiopia in the geopolitical extensions of the Red Sea

Written- Abdul Jalil Suleiman

Executive Summary

This article examines the transformations of geopolitical balance in the Red Sea region, by focusing on Eritrea maritime, and aspiring strategies of Ethiopia to get out of the geographical siege imposed on it since the independence of Eritrea in 1993. It also highlights the opportunities wasted in Eritrean ports, led by the nervous port, which has witnessed a decline in the Emirati presence since 2021, and compares this. With the endeavors of Ethiopia to build its own sea outlet, whether through Somalia or alternative political arrangements.

Besides; The article discusses the changing regional dynamics in the Red Sea, and the transformations of maritime influence between local and international powers, with a central question being asked: Can Eritrea be replaced as a marine strategic actor, not just a crossing for others.

From closure to geographical openness

Since Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Ethiopia has turned into the largest in the world in terms of population, deprived of direct access to the Red Sea. This geographical transformation represented a decisive turning point in Ethiopia’s awareness of its regional role; As it is considered to be a national security issue, which goes beyond trade to the depth of the strategic vision of the state.

On the other hand, Eritrea retained an exceptional geographical location, which places it at the top of the geopolitical extensions of the Red Sea, but it did not invest it as equivalent to its importance, due to internal and external factors

Coasts in the heart of the Red Sea

Eritrea has a coastal strip with a length of more than 1,150 km on the Red Sea, extending from the head of Kassar to the north to the Bab al -Mandab Strait in the south, and includes axial ports such as Massawa and Assab. This site gives it an inherent ability to play a pivotal role in maritime security and regional trade, but it has been largely broken or dominant.

Despite the geostrategic importance, Eritrea has not activated these coasts as a national power tool. The isolation policies that the state pursued during the first two decades after independence, in addition to the international sanctions imposed on it (2009-2018) led to undermining its maritime capabilities and the absence of structural investments in the infrastructure of the coastal ports and corridors.

With the Red Sea turning into a frantic competition between regional and international powers, Eritrea began to attract more attention.

In this context, the United Arab Emirates established between 2015-2016 a large military base in the port of Asb, which it used to support its military operations in Yemen, and it was one of the most prominent aspects of external employment of the Eritrean site. However, this did not last long; The UAE has started a gradual withdrawal from the air base and the port early in 2021, and the operation included the dismantling of the majority of military installations, including drones for drones.

Satellite photos showed in February 2021 the decline in military activity, while the official contract for the use of the site remained in formally, and the remaining presence was limited to logistical facilities and civilian facilities.

This decline in Emirati military employment highlights the absence of an independent Eritrean national strategy that resumes the country as a major actor in the Red Sea equations.

Ethiopia: Marine necessity and paths searching for the port

On the other hand, Ethiopia is a model for the beloved state, which is trying to reproduce its maritime presence through diplomatic, security and commercial tools. Although more than 90% of its trade passes through the port of Djibouti, the unilateral dependence on Djibouti made the maritime port an issue is a pressure on its economic stability and strategic security.

This desire has emerged strongly in the speech of Prime Minister Abe Ahmed, who indicated on more than one occasion that Ethiopia has a “natural right” to reach the sea, proposing formulas to share coastal resources with neighboring countries.

The most prominent manifestations of this trend appeared in the Ethiopia Convention – Somaliland (Somaliland) in early 2024, which included granting Ethiopia a sea outlet near Berbera port, in exchange for political recognition in a region looking for recognition as a state of ².

The intermittent conversations with Eritrea on reactivating its ports in favor of Ethiopia have not led to concrete results since the signing of the peace agreement with Ethiopia in 2018.

Despite these moves, the Ethiopian maritime transformation faces structural obstacles represented in the lack of confidence with its coastal neighbors, and the lack of clarity of the long -term strategic vision, which makes the Ethiopian maritime ambition commenting on external balances more than stem from internal capabilities.

The major powers and influence map compete in the Red Sea

The Red Sea coasts are no longer just water lines, but rather turned into a multi -polar strategic influence. Includes interests:

* Regional countries: (Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Egypt, Türkiye, Iran).

** Great powers: (United States, China, Russia).

In this context, possession of ports is no longer enough, but rather “the ability to manage, politicize and use them as a pressure card” is the essence of geopolitical conflict.

As the Chinese role in the development of dual -use ports (civil -military) escalated, and the entry of new powers in the Bab al -Mandab strait, the need to understand Eritrea and Ethiopia increases as two strategic pharaohs, not as just two ends.

From geography to political effectiveness

Eritrea still has a geographical location that is not matched by any location in the region in terms of potential impact, but it has not yet done it as a national force crane.

On the other hand, Ethiopia is fighting a turbulent path for maritime positioning, ranging from border diplomacy and political barter, but reveals a deep strategic desire to break the marine isolation imposed for decades.

Among the two, the Red Sea remains a space to redefine sovereignty and redistribute influence, as neither of the two countries can be excluded from the new regional security equation.